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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case arises out of a challenge to an informal adjudicative proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-15 allows dismissal of a suit challenging an informal 
adjudicative proceeding for failure to prosecute the suit to final judgment within 
certain time periods. Where an appeal has been taken, the statute provides a three-
year time period. Plaintiffs/appellants filed this action on December 15, 2006. 
Although plaintiffs/appellants do not believe the limitations in § 73-3-15 apply in a 
case involving an erroneous dismissal for lack of standing, out of an abundance of 
caution they nevertheless respectfully request that these proceedings be expedited 
so that, if the decision below is reversed, the case can be remanded to the district 
court in time to conclude trial and obtain a final judgment before December 15, 
2009. 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves the legal requirements for standing in potential injury 
cases. The Browns, Sorensons, and Mclntyre are neighbors living adjacent to 
Little Cottonwood Creek in Murray, Utah. Mclntyre submitted an application to 
the State Division of Water Rights for a permit to build a bridge across the creek. 
The Browns and Sorensons (hereafter the "Neighbors") opposed the application 
because the bridge would create a substantial risk of flooding and serious damage 
to their properties in times of high water flow. The Division granted the permit 
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anyway. The Neighbors then filed suit in the Third District Court against Mclntyre 
and the Division challenging the decision and seeking injunctive relief. 
Mclntyre filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing which the district 
court granted because, the court held, the Neighbors' alleged property injuries are 
only potential harms that have yet to occur and may not occur in the future. The 
court stated that "[i]f, down the roadw construction of the bridge starts these 
possible [flooding] events in action, Plaintiffs would then have standing to assert 
their claims." See Addendum ("Add."), at 5, n.l (memorandum decision). Until 
then, the district court held, the Neighbors lack standing. A divided panel of the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Neighbors' complaint failed to supply 
proof that harm was impending or certain. 
The majority decision below should be reversed because it misstates Utah 
law and sets an improperly high threshold for standing in cases involving potential 
injury to property. It is well established that risk of significant injury is sufficient 
for standing and that a party facing such risk need not wait until the harm actually 
occurs before seeking legal protection. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club 
v. Utah Air Quality Bd. (? Sierra Club"), 2006 UT 74, ^  29 ("If the emissions from 
the proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of those persons 
who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents must actually develop a 
health problem before they have standing.") (emphasis added). Granting standing 
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to those who face a real risk of harm to their properties from a neighbor's actions is 
fully consistent with the separation-of-powers concerns animating this Court's 
standing jurisprudence. By contrast, the rule established below -requiring a 
property owner to wait until the threatened harm becomes imminent or certain - is 
without precedent in Utah law and makes little practical sense; indeed, it would 
dramatically skew the law in favor of compensating completed harms over 
preventing them in the first place. 
The Neighbors ask nothing more than an opportunity to protect their 
properties and homes by proving their claims in the ordinary course of litigation. 
The majority decision below improperly denied them that opportunity. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3) and 
(5). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
This Court's order of March 18, 2009 granted the Neighbors' petition for a 
writ of certiorari on the following issue: 
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred 
in affirming the district court's dismissal based on lack of 
standing." 
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This issue turns on two subsidiary issues: 
1. Whether persons facing potentially serious harm to their properties 
and homes from a nearby property owner's actions have standing to sue to stop the 
harm before it occurs or whether, as the decision below holds, they must wait until 
the harm actually occurs or is imminent. 
2. Whether allegations in a complaint that a nearby property owner's 
actions create a significant risk of serious property damage are sufficient to survive 
a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 
Standard of Review. Whether a plaintiff has standing under an undisputed 
set of facts is a question of law. The decision below affirming the trial court's 
dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing is reviewed for correctness on 
appeal. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 15; see also Stocks v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, \ 9. 
Preservation. These issues was the subject of Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss, 
which the Neighbors opposed (R. 125-35), and of the decision below. 
REPORT OF THE DECISION BELOW 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 195 P.3d 933, 2008 UT 
App 353. The slip opinion ("Op.") is contained in the Addendum. See Add. at 10. 
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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 provides that "any person aggrieved by an order 
of the state engineer may obtain judicial review." Whether a person is "aggrieved" 
is governed by traditional standing requirements. Washington County Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, fflf 11, 16. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiffs/appellants Lawrence and Marilyn Brown and Joseph and Kathleen 
Sorenson (the "Neighbors") brought this action in Third District Court against 
defendants/appellees State Engineer and Division of Water Rights of the Utah 
State Department of Natural Resources (collectively the "Division") and real-
party-in-interest James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") challenging the granting of a 
permit to build a bridge. A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's dismissal for lack of standing. This Court granted the 
Neighbors' petition for a writ of certiorari on the standing issue. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On August 21, 2006, Mclntyre filed an application with the Division to 
construct a bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek. (R. 3, 10-12.) On September 
20, 2006, the Neighbors submitted an Objection to Mclntyre's Application. (R. 3, 
14-18.) The Division approved the Application on October 11, 2006. (R. 3, 38-
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39.) On October 31, 2006, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 and Utah 
Admin. Code § R655-6-17, the Neighbors filed a request for reconsideration (R. 4, 
41-44), which the Division denied on November 17, 2006 (R. 4, 89). 
On December 15, 2006, the Neighbors filed their "Petition for Judicial 
Review of Informal Administrative Proceedings and Agency Action and 
Complaint for Injunctive Relief ("complaint") in the Third District Court 
challenging the Division's action. (R. 1; see also Add. at 22 (complaint).) The 
complaint named the Division and Mclntyre as defendants. On January 29, 2007, 
Mclntyre filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming the Neighbors lacked standing (R. 
112, 143), which the Neighbors opposed (R. 125). 
On March 22, 2007, the Neighbors learned that Mclntyre had commenced 
construction activities on the bridge. (R. 166.) The next day, March 23, 2007, the 
Neighbors filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction (R. 159), which the district court denied after an informal in camera 
hearing that same day (R. 212). The court made no findings of fact or conclusions 
of law. {Id.) 
On April 20, 2007, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision 
granting Mclntyre's motion to dismiss. (R. 214-18.) On May 14, 2007, the district 
court entered an order dismissing all claims based on its ruling that the Neighbors 
lacked standing. (R. 220-21; see Add. at 7 (memorandum decision and order).) 
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The Neighbors filed a timely appeal. (R. 236, 239.) On October 2, 2008, a 
divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, Associate 
Presiding Judge William A. Thorne, Jr. dissenting. (See Add. at 10.) On March 
18, 2009, this Court granted the Neighbors' petition for a writ of certiorari. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Allegations in the Complaint. The Neighbors' complaint alleges the 
following well-pleaded facts, which are assumed true in this appeal from the grant 
of a motion to dismiss. Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 
UT 27, t 5. 
The Neighbors reside in Murray, Utah along Little Cottonwood Creek. (R. 
2-3.) Their neighbor, Mclntyre, obtained a permit from the Division to build - and 
eventually did build - a bridge across the creek. (R. 3.) The bridge spans an 
environmentally fragile area that has already experienced significant flooding and 
has a high risk of future flooding. (R. 3, 5.) 
The bridge increases the existing flood risk and danger to the Neighbors' 
properties and those of nearby landowners. (R. 5.) Specifically, the bridge and 
associated access ramps will alter the channel of the stream and thereby (1) 
diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high water flows, (2) heighten the 
potential for damming, and thus (3) increase the risk of flood-related damage in the 
area where the Neighbors live. (R. 4-5.) In the event of flooding caused or 
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exacerbated by the bridge, the natural stream environment will be adversely 
affected or destroyed. (R. 5.) 
The Neighbors hired an engineering firm, Secor International ("Secor"), to 
analyze the potential effects of building the bridge in its current location. (R. 5, 
91.) The Secor Report of October 30, 2009, which was attached to the complaint, 
finds that the approved bridge design provides for a one-foot clearance over a high-
water mark of 526 cubic feet per second. (R. 5-6, 97; Add. at 40.) Water flows 
have previously exceeded the bridge's one-foot clearance level. For example, on 
June 1, 1984, the flow through the creek would have exceeded the bridge's height 
by 70%, with a water depth of 6.58 feet and water flow of 898 cubic feet per 
second. Such water levels would flow over and significantly increase the stress on 
the bridge as approved and now built. (Id.) 
The Secor Report also finds that if flows like those in 1984 occur in the 
stream channel as altered by the bridge, the bridge could have a damming effect 
that causes the stream banks to overflow and inundate the first-level flood plains 
on both sides of the stream, causing significant erosion and damage to the 
Neighbors' properties. (Id.) Because of the fragility of the land near the creek, 
there has already been subsidence of the Neighbors' properties, which has caused 
foundation and settling cracks in their homes. (R. 6.) The Neighbors allege that 
the bridge will result in irreparable harm to their homes and properties. (Id.) 
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Subsequent Construction of the Bridge. On March 22, 2007, despite on-
going litigation in the district court, Mclntyre began building his bridge. As noted, 
the district court denied the Neighbors' motion for TRO. (R. 159, 212.) The 
bridge has since been completed and the alleged risks are now literally set in 
concrete. See Op., f 15 n.2. 
D. The Majority Opinion and Dissent Below. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals (Judge Judith M. Billings writing 
for the majority) affirmed the ruling of the district court and held that the 
Neighbors lack standing to bring their claims. The majority recited the "traditional 
test" for standing, which "requires a plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Op., f 6 
(quoting Washington County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT, j^ 20) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the Neighbors had 
made such a showing, the majority focused exclusively on the first part of the 
three-part inquiry in Sierra Club, namely, whether the party has "assert[ed] that it 
has been or will be adversely affected by the [challenged] actions." Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74, Tf 19 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Op., \ 7. 
Drawing from federal standing cases, the majority then reformulated this test as an 
examination of "whether Plaintiffs' interests are 4(a) concrete and particularized, 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Op., \ 8 (quoting 
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
The majority agreed that the Neighbors have alleged a particularized interest 
satisfying the first requirement. It noted that the Neighbors "own property along 
Little Cottonwood Creek where Mclntyre has built his bridge" and thus that 
"[t]heir property is at risk if there is significant flooding of Little Cottonwood 
Creek." Id \ 9. 
As to whether the Neighbors' interests are "actual or imminent," the 
majority acknowledged the established rule "that threatened rather than actual 
injury can satisfy . . . standing requirements." Op., f^ 10 (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). But ignoring Sierra Club's analysis of this issue, the majority 
instead relied on federal civil rights cases for the notion that standing in potential-
injury cases requires "'an individualized showing that there is a very significant 
possibility that the future harm will ensue.'" Op., f 10 (quoting Nelsen v. King 
County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted; 
emphasis omitted). 
Reviewing the pleadings, the majority held that "[the] allegations [in the 
complaint] do not rise to the level of demonstrating an actual or imminent injury to 
Plaintiffs." Op., Tf 13. The majority faulted the Neighbors because, rather than 
providing concrete proof, the complaint alleged "simply conclusory statements that 
10 
the bridge will alter Little Cottonwood Creek's natural stream flow and that 
Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs." Id. The problem, the majority said, 
was that "[t]he complaint simply provides the Plaintiffs' opinions regarding their 
fears and concerns of a potential future harm." Id, 
We acknowledge that the complaint does assert some actual facts 
suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause harm to 
Plaintiffs' property. . . . Indeed, the engineer's report attached to the 
complaint shows a danger of possible damage to Plaintiffs' property if 
Little Cottonwood Creek's water flows reach the same levels that they 
did in 1984. However, the potential dangers are contingent on key, 
unknown events - an increased water flow or a flood - which are 
dictated by unknown weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs' injury 
depends on "4 contingent future events that may not occur as 
anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.'" 
Id. \ 14 (citations omitted). 
The majority found the Neighbors' complaint deficient for "not ma[king] 
any other allegations or offering] any other evidence that a similar flood is 
immediate or at least certainly impending" and for not alleging "what work was 
done to Little Cottonwood Creek after the 1984 flood to prevent future flooding in 
the area." Id. f 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And despite 
acknowledging that allegations in a complaint must be deemed true on a motion to 
dismiss, "with any inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims" {id. % 5), the 
majority found the Neighbors' allegations defective because they required the 
court "to infer what events might transpire to cause [the Neighbors] harm in the 
future." Id. ^ 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The majority 
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"concludefd] that although Plaintiffs have demonstrated an individual, 
particularized interest in the construction of Mclntyre's bridge, they have not 
demonstrated that any potential injury to their property is actual or imminent. The 
threat of any harm to their property is too speculative because it is contingent on 
unknown future events." Id. \ 16 (emphasis added). 
Judge Thorne dissented because the majority failed to accept the allegations 
in the complaint as true, essentially adjudicating factual issues on a motion to 
dismiss: "[S]tanding issues may present questions of fact that need to be resolved 
through the ordinary adversarial process. In this case, both the degree and 
likelihood of harm alleged by Plaintiffs constitute such questions of fact." Id, \ 18 
(citation and quotation marks omitted) (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
[T]he only question we should be considering on appeal is whether 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges sufficient harm to confer standing, not 
whether that harm actually exists. I believe that the complaint clearly 
meets this requirement. The complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge 
will cause "immediate and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of 
flooding in the surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and 
damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the 
bridge" if that flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there 
is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged individualized 
harm sufficient to confer standing in this matter. 
Id. \ 20 (Thome, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Judge Thome emphasized that such allegations had yet to be proven, and 
that the Neighbors would "still have to establish their alleged facts in order for the 
district court to ultimately have jurisdiction to consider their complaint. But, that 
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is a matter for trial, or perhaps summary judgment." Id. f 21 (Thorne, J., 
dissenting). The standing issue "should not have been resolved against Plaintiffs 
upon a motion to dismiss." Id. (Thorne, J., dissenting). Judge Thorne concluded: 
Mclntyre's bridge may or may not present the risk of harm alleged by 
Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs did allege that the bridge will increase 
the risk of significant damage to their property, and that is sufficient, 
in my opinion, to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In 
granting the motion, the district court improperly weighed the degree 
of risk alleged by Plaintiffs when it should have simply accepted the 
allegation of increased risk as true. In my opinion, this was error by 
the district court, and I would reverse the dismissal order and remand 
this matter for further proceedings. 
Id. \ 22 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law of standing exists to ensure that a plaintiff has a personal stake in 
the litigation rather than a general or ideological grievance. The primary concern 
is to avoid judicial conflict with the constitutionally-based policy-making powers 
of the legislature and executive. Standing requirements weed out those who lack a 
concrete interest in the case. But standing analysis is not intended to determine the 
merits of a lawsuit - the threshold is low. Under this Court's jurisprudence, a party 
has standing at the pleading stage if it (1) alleges that it has been or will be 
adversely impacted by the challenged actions, (2) alleges a causal connection 
between the injury, the challenged actions, and the relief requested in the lawsuit, 
and (3) seeks relief that is substantially likely to redress the alleged injury. Sierra 
Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 29. 
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The Neighbors easily meet these requirements. The complaint alleges that 
Mclntyre's bridge directly endangers not generalized or public interests but the 
Neighbors' own homes and properties. There is a close causal relationship 
between those potential injuries, Defendants' actions, and the injunctive relief the 
Neighbors seek. And the injunctive relief they seek would redress the threatened 
injury. Nothing more is required. 
The majority opinion errs in holding that the Neighbors were required to 
demonstrate an "actual or imminent harm" to their properties to survive Mclntyre's 
motion to dismiss. This was error on three grounds. Op., 1f 11. First, this Court 
has held that even "potential" harm to person or property creates standing - a 
plaintiff need not wait until the risk materializes before suing. Sierra Club, 2006 
UT 74, f^ 29. Second, an increased risk of injury to person or property is itself an 
actual harm for standing purposes. And third, at the pleading stage the Neighbors' 
allegations that the bridge increases the risk of significant damage to their 
properties are more than enough to establish standing. 
None of which is to say that the Neighbors will ultimately prevail on the 
merits. The strength of the Neighbors' claims is not at issue. The only question is 
whether they have alleged a sufficient stake in the outcome to satisfy the low 
threshold for standing. They plainly have. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE AGGRIEVED PARTIES WHO HAVE STANDING 
TO BRING THIS ACTION. 
A. Standard of Review. 
"Whether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law" and hence on appeal 
the court "accord[s] no deference to the ruling of the trial court." Stocks, 2000 UT 
App, \ 9 (quotation marks omitted); Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f^ 15; Provo City 
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989). Additionally, this case was 
dismissed on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 252 at 12-13.) On a motion to 
dismiss, a court presumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).1 
The same rule applies to the threshold issue of standing. "For purposes of ruling 
on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts 
must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the 
complaint in favor of the complaining party." Warth v. Seldin, Ml U.S. 490, 501 
(1975). And a[b]ecause the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, 
[the appellate court] give[s] the trial court's ruling no deference and review[s] it 
under a correctness standard." St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 196. 
1
 The court may also consider the materials that were attached to the complaint. See 
Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertson's Inc., 2004 UT 101, If 10 ("The rules are clear that 
documents attached to a complaint are incorporated into the pleadings for purposes of 
judicial notice and are fair game for this court to consider in addition to the complaint's 
averments."). 
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The plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove standing, but "[a]t the pleading 
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct 
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, [the court] presume[s] that general 
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. It is enough at the pleading stage, for example, for the 
plaintiffs to "allege[] that they could prove causation" (an element of standing) if 
given the chance: "that is all that is required at this phase." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 
74, Tj 32. Otherwise, a full investigation of causation on a motion to dismiss would 
be necessary, which "would, in many cases, supplant the trial process on the merits 
of the underlying claim." Id. In sum, this Court should accept as true the material 
allegations in the complaint and construe them and all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the Neighbors. 
B. General Standing Principles, 
In contrast with Article III standing in federal courts, standing under Utah 
law is not strictly a matter of jurisdiction but of prudence and judicial modesty. 
"Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not 
The plaintiffs burden increases "with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation," so that in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, for example, a plaintiff could no longer rely on the pleadings. Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 561. But even at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff only has to establish that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether standing exists. See Central Delta 
Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Steel Company 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998)). 
16 
constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States 
Constitution requiring 'cases' and 'controversies,' since no similar requirement 
exists in the Utah Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 
1983). The overarching concern guiding this Court's standing jurisprudence is "to 
protect the separation of powers under the Utah Constitution." Sierra Club, 2006 
U T 7 4 , f l 2 . 
Standing is a concept "rooted in the historical and constitutional role 
of the judiciary" as one of three separate and equal branches of 
government. [Citation omitted.] Through our case law, we have 
developed the requirement that a party have standing in order "to 
confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of powers, 
and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are 
most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process." 
Id. % 11 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149). Standing doctrine helps ensure that 
litigants do not use the judiciary to decide public policy issues that are the 
constitutional prerogative of the political branches. Courts are best equipped to 
address real disputes among real parties with a real stake in the outcome rather 
than broad questions of policy.3 
Hence, this Court requires only that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. Adverse parties with 
specific interests at stake ensure that the court has "a concrete factual context 
This Court in Sierra Club underscored that separation-of-powers concerns lie at the 
heart of the standing analysis when it repeatedly emphasized that granting standing to 
two of the plaintiffs in that case would not encroach on the policy-making prerogatives of 
the executive or legislature and would not open the court doors to those with merely 
generalized grievances. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT, fflf 11, 12, 17, 25, 26, 28. 
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conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Id. at 
1149 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "It is generally insufficient for a 
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common with members of the 
public at large." Id. at 1148. Such "generalized grievances . . . are more 
appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches of the state 
government." Id. 
To ensure that a plaintiff challenging the Division's approval of an 
application has a personal stake in the outcome, Utah law limits appeals to those 
who are "aggrieved" by an agency decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 ("any 
person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review"). 
Whether a party is aggrieved involves the same analysis as the "traditional 
standing requirement that a plaintiff show particularized injury." Washington 
County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT, Tf 1130. The traditional test has three 
elements: 
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be adversely 
affected by the challenged actions. Second, the party must allege a 
causal relationship between the injury to the party, the challenged 
actions, and the relief requested. Third, the relief requested must be 
substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. If the party can 
satisfy these three criteria, the party has standing to pursue its claims 
before the courts of this state. 
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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C. Sierra Club Establishes That Potential Harm to Person or 
Property Gives Rise to Standing Under Utah Law, 
This Court has already addressed standing in cases involving potential injury 
to person or property. In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club sought judicial review of a 
permit allowing a power company to build a coal-fired power plant in the vicinity 
of the Colorado Plateau. 2006 UT 74, \ 2. To support its standing, the Sierra Club 
submitted affidavits from three of its members. This Court held that two of the 
three had standing. One, Mr. Cass, alleged that the plant's future emissions would 
impair visibility (thus harming his videographer business), decrease the value of 
his property, and impair his health. Id. f 4. The second, Ms. Roberts, alleged that 
future emissions would contaminate the soil, damage the crops of her farm, and 
affect her health and that of her children and neighbors. Id. % 5. 
Although these alleged injuries were based on fears of potential future 
effects, this Court had no trouble finding standing based on the fact that the alleged 
injuries were particular to them rather than society at large: 
Mr. Cass and Ms. Roberts have met the adverse effects requirement 
because they either live or recreate, or both, near the site of the plant 
and have alleged injuries particular to them, rather than expressing 
generalized concerns about the plant's impact on the public at large. 
Id. \ 28 (emphasis added). The fact the alleged injuries were merely potential 
harms in no way undermined standing. This Court specifically concluded that Mr. 
Cass's and Ms. Roberts's concerns about potential health risks were alone 
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sufficient to confer standing - even before the harm actually developed or became 
imminent and despite the fact that the alleged harm might never develop: 
We reject the suggestion that a party must identify a risk to an existing 
health condition in order to have standing. If the emissions from the 
proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of those 
persons who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents 
must actually develop a health problem before they have standing. 
Id. % 29 (emphasis added). By contrast, the third Sierra Club member had alleged 
only a generalized concern that was insufficient for standing: "Expressions of 
concern, without a claim of actual or potential injury to the party, are too 
generalized to qualify as a distinct and palpable injury under the traditional 
criteria." Id. \ 27 (emphasis added). 
The majority below failed to address Sierra Club's holding regarding 
potential injury. The rule it established is erroneous because, contrary to Sierra 
Club, it denies standing in potential injury cases. It requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate an "actual or imminent" injury (Op., <[J 16 (emphasis added)) rather 
than an "actual or potential injury." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, % 27 (emphasis 
added). The majority below essentially redefines "potential" to mean "imminent," 
which is a much higher hurdle to overcome - at least as defined by the majority. 
Applying this more onerous standard, the majority held that the Neighbors lack 
standing despite acknowledging that "[i]t is clear from the complaint that [the 
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Neighbors] have a personal interest in the dispute" because "[t]heir property is at 
risk if there is significant flooding of Little Cottonwood Creek." Op., f^ 9. 
If the majority's high threshold had been the standard in Sierra Club, this 
Court would have been forced to deny standing because no one could show that an 
unconstructed power plant - one that might not be built for years - threatened 
"imminent" injuries to the health or property of specific individuals. Indeed, all 
the alleged health injuries this Court found sufficient for standing were mere risks 
(potential outcomes) that depended on unknown physiological reactions to various 
types of emissions. There was no suggestion in Sierra Club that anyone alleged a 
unique or documented health issue with the specific type of pollution the plant 
would emit. In fact, this Court rejected such a requirement. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 
74, | 29 ("We reject the suggestion that a party must identify a risk to an existing 
health condition in order to have standing."). The plaintiffs alleged nothing more 
than potential and basically unknowable future risks created by the proposed power 
plant - there was never any assurance that the alleged future harms would occur. 
Yet this Court had no hesitation finding standing for the two plaintiffs who had 
alleged "potential harms" that were "particular to them." Id. ffif 24, 28. Unlike the 
majority below, this Court did not assess the seriousness of the risk or the 
likelihood that potential harms might occur, implicitly recognizing that such 
questions go to the merits of the case and not to standing. 
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This Court should reject the rule established by the majority below because 
it will result in dismissals based on standing in numerous cases seeking to prevent 
potential harms. Those, like the Neighbors, with compelling personal reasons to 
fear that nearby construction will result in serious damage to their properties in the 
event of flooding, earthquake, mudslides, or other natural and largely unpredictable 
phenomena will rarely be able to show that such risks are "imminent" - in the 
sense of "about to occur" - before it is too late for legal action and their properties 
are irreparably damaged or destroyed. Claims that a proposed building suffers 
from structural defects that create risks of severe harm to neighbors' properties or 
persons would be dismissed at the pleading stage without ever reaching the merits. 
Potential environmental injuries - often based on projected health risks with 
potentially serious but ultimately uncertain future effects - could never be litigated 
before they materialized as specific injuries in specific individuals and thus were 
too late to stop. The decision below fundamentally conflicts with this Court's 
standing jurisprudence and sound judicial policy. 
D. Federal Courts Also Recognize Standing in Cases Involving 
Merely Potential Harm, 
The majority below essentially ignored Sierra Club and instead relied 
heavily on what the court incorrectly understood to be federal standing law. See 
Op-> 1Hf 8-10, 14-15. Although federal standing law is more restrictive than Utah 
law because of Article III, federal courts have long held that a risk to health or 
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property is itself a type of actual injury sufficient to give rise to standing. "Courts 
have . . . left no doubt that threatened injury . . . is by itself injury in fact." Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (potential 
environmental injury); see also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 
557 (5th Cir. 1996) ("That the injury is cast in terms of future impairment rather 
than past impairment is of no moment."). "Threats or increased risk thus 
constitutes cognizable harm." Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160. The 
Fourth Circuit noted that although such threats are "probabilistic," even so "other 
circuits have had no trouble understanding the injurious nature of risk itself." Id. 
The Ninth Circuit has likewise stated: "[Threatened injury constitutes injury in 
fact." Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
Federal courts have also recognized that the likelihood of the potential injury 
does not have to be great to confer standing under Article III. In Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the D.C. Circuit 
held that even a 1 in 200,000 risk that someone will develop nonfatal skin cancer 
as a result of an EPA rule was sufficient injury-in-fact for standing. The court 
acknowledged the same "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural5 or 'hypothetical'" 
language relied on by the majority below in this case. Id. at 6 (quoting Whitmore 
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 
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95, 101-02 (1983)); Op., Tf 10. But it explained that federal courts nevertheless 
allow standing based on "probabilistic" health or property injuries if plaintiffs 
"demonstrate a 'substantial probability' that they will be injured." 464 F.3d at 6 
(citations omitted). The court held that a 1 in 200,000 risk was substantial enough. 
Likewise, in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 
1993), the Village brought suit to enjoin the Corps of Engineers from granting a 
permit for construction of a radio tower in the floodplain of a nearby creek. The 
Village asserted that the creek was "flood-prone" and that the tower would 
increase the risk of flooding by limiting the creek's drainage area. The court held 
this was a legally cognizable injury. "The injury is of course probabilistic, but 
even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy - to 
take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical - provided, of course that the 
relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability." Id. at 329 (citing Pennell 
v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), and Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980)) 
(emphasis added). 
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 
1996), the court found standing based on a moderate increase in the risk of forest 
fires due to a logging plan approved by the Forest Service. Standing is proper, the 
court held, where the risk is "non-trivial" and "sufficient... to take a suit out of 
the category of the hypothetical." Id. at 1234-35. The court observed that the 
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increase in risk required for standing may be inversely proportional to the degree 
of potential harm: 
Of course for a probabilistic event such as a wildfire, almost any act 
(other than, say, deliberate setting of a fire) merely affects 
probabilities, but we do not understand the customary rejection of 
"speculative" causal links as ruling out all probabilistic injuries. The 
more drastic the injury that government action makes more likely, the 
lesser the increment in probability necessary to establish standing. . . . 
[T]he potential destruction of fire is so severe that relatively modest 
increments in risk should qualify for standing. 
Id. at 1234. 
The United States Supreme Court recently cited Village of Elk Grove and 
Mountain States Legal Foundation with approval in holding that the risks to a 
state's sovereign territory of uncertain harms due to global warming can give rise 
to standing. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1458 n.23 
(2007). Earlier, the High Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), allowed a suit to go forward where 
plaintiffs sued over approval of a new nuclear power plant. Part of their alleged 
injuries was the risk of a nuclear accident. Rejecting the assertion that the claim 
was not ripe (a closely related inquiry under Article III) because "no nuclear 
accident has yet occurred," the Supreme Court held that the legal issues were 
sufficiently concrete to be ready for decision. The Court recognized that "delayed 
resolution of these issues would foreclose any relief from the present injury 
suffered by appellees - relief that would be forthcoming if they were to prevail. . . 
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." Id. at 82 (emphasis added). A nuclear meltdown does not have to be imminent 
before a plaintiff can sue to prevent future harm. 
The rule of these and other federal decisions overlooked by the court below 
is that "the injurious nature of risk itself is an injury-in-fact for purposes of 
standing in cases involving potential injury to person or property. Friends of the 
Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160. Where that risk is non-trivial, standing is proper. 
Federal decisions also recognize that proving the quantum of the increased 
risk of harm goes to the merits of the claim and generally should not be addressed 
as a matter of standing. In Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C. Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th 
Cir. 2005), the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a class of aas-of-yet uninjured" 
individuals alleging that a medical device implanted during bypass surgery 
increased the risk of aortic bypass stenosis. Id. at 570. The trial court held that the 
alleged injury was "'purely hypothetical'" and thus denied standing. The Sixth 
Circuit reversed: "'[Cjourts have long recognized that an increased risk of harm, 
which the plaintiff alleges, is an injury-in-fact.'" Id. at 573-74 (quoting In re 
Propulsid Prod. Liability Litigation, 208 F.R.D. 133, 139 (E.D. La. 2002)). The 
court held that it was improper to require the plaintiff to show as part of the 
standing inquiry how significant the increased risk may be. "[T]o require a 
plaintiff to so clearly demonstrate her injury in order to confer standing is to 
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prematurely evaluate the merits of her claims." Id. at 575.4 Just like this Court in 
Sierra Club, the Sutton court also recognized the value of allowing a plaintiff to 
address a problem before the injury occurs: "[Tjhere is something to be said for 
disease prevention, as opposed to disease treatment. Waiting for a plaintiff to 
suffer physical injury before allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly harsh 
and economically inefficient." Id.; see Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 29 ("[W]e see 
no reason why these residents must actually develop a health problem before they 
have standing."). 
In a related vein, because of the injurious nature of risk itself, proving the 
inevitability and immediacy of the ultimate injury is not a prerequisite to standing. 
In Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978), the court held that inmates 
concerned about the risk of fire at a prison had standing. The court reasoned that 
the defendant "inaptly construes the requirement of injury as requiring proof that 
the inmates inevitably will suffer physical injury or death from fire before they 
have standing to challenge the hazardous fire conditions . . . existing at [the 
prison]." On the contrary, the court held, "[o]ne need not wait for the 
4
 Consistent with federal decisions, this Court has recognized that the merits inquiry is 
separate from the standing inquiry, and that it is neither "necessary [n]or appropriate for 
us to consider the merits of the petitioners' claim in deciding whether they have 
standing." Society ofProfessionalJournalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 
1170 n.3 (Utah 1987); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (although standing 
may exist in certain cases based solely on a statute creating a legal right, the invasion of 
which creates standing, "standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs 
contention that particular conduct is illegal"). 
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conflagration before concluding that a real and present threat exists." Id.at 18; see 
also Sutton, 419 F.3d at 572 (plaintiff is not required to show "immediacy" of the 
injury to have standing). 
These federal decisions are consistent with this Court's holding in Sierra 
Club and eminently sensible. The principle that risk of future harm to person or 
property is itself injurious comports with common sense. An increased risk of 
future damage to property - such as from an increased flood risk to a home -
necessarily decreases the current value of the property, increases th e costs of 
insurance, creates costs to ameliorate the risk, and decreases the enjoyment of 
ownership. These are real, not hypothetical, harms. If impairment of a person's 
enjoyment of purely aesthetic things is enough for standing {Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)), the same must be true of acts that diminish the 
physical integrity, value, safety, and enjoyment of one's own home. 
The majority decision below creates needless conflict with federal decisions 
recognizing "the injurious nature of risk itself." Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 
F.3d at 160. It relies on inapplicable language from federal cases rejecting 
speculative claims about future government infringement of personal or civil 
rights, such as the unpublished decision in Resident Councils of Washington v. 
Thompson, 2005 WL 1027123 (W.D. Wash.) {^'Resident Councils"). See Op., f 
10. In fact, the majority decision basically repeats the analysis in Resident 
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Councils. Plaintiffs there sought to prohibit the federal government "from 
implementing regulations which would permit the use of paid feeding assistants in 
nursing homes" because they believed the assistants lacked proper training. 2005 
WL 1027123, p. * 1 . But it was entirely "speculative" whether any of the 
individual plaintiffs would ever be affected by the regulations. Id. at p. *4. Four 
of the five individual plaintiffs didn't require feeding assistance and might never in 
the future. The fifth required such assistance but her condition made her 
"ineligible for feeding assistant aid" under the challenged regulations. Id. at p. *4. 
Lacking even a present risk of harm, the court denied standing. 
The other cases the opinion quotes involved civil rights claims based on 
flimsy speculation about future government infringements or claims based on 
legislation that had yet to pass.5 None of these cases involved an actual, present 
5
 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (denying standing for 
equitable relief based on speculative fears that police would use illegal chokehold during 
potential future stop for traffic violation or other offense; "The plaintiff must show that 
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result 
of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Nelsen 
v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying standing in civil rights case 
against alcohol treatment center by former residents because "the threat of future harm to 
[plaintiffs] is based upon an extended chain of highly speculative contingencies," 
including that plaintiffs would again become indigent alcohol abusers); J. Roderick 
MacArthur Found v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying standing to sue 
FBI for mere retention of information files on plaintiffs because "speculative at best55 that 
any injury would occur; "Such 'someday5 injuries are insufficient.55); Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (third party lacks standing to challenge death sentence 
imposed on capital defendant who waived appeal rights where alleged interest is third 
party's desire that criminal database be complete for purposes of evaluating his own 
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risk of injury such as exists here. The foregoing review demonstrates that even 
under Article IIFs more restrictive standing requirements numerous federal 
decisions have found standing based on potential injury to person or property. The 
opinion below sets too high a hurdle for standing based on a misreading of federal 
case law. 
E. The Complaint Establishes the Neighbors9 Standing. 
The complaint alleges all that is necessary under the traditional test to 
establish standing at the pleading stage: the Neighbors allege that (1) they "ha[ve] 
been or will be adversely affected by the challenged actions"; (2) there exists "a 
causal relationship between the injury to [them], the challenged actions, and the 
relief requested"; and (3) "the relief requested [is] substantially likely to redress the 
injury claimed." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 19 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
1. The Neighbors have alleged particularized injuries. 
The complaint alleges specific potential harms to the Neighbors' properties. 
It claims that the permit authorizes construction of a bridge that will reduce the 
capital crime in potential future sentencing proceedings); LP A Inc. v. Chao, 211 
F.Supp.2d 160 (D.D.C. 2002) (no standing because no state has enacted the challenged 
legislation; "[T]he injury plaintiffs seek to avoid is too speculative to satisfy the standing 
requirements.'5); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568, 
580 (1985) (ripeness decision: challenge to constitutionality of federal arbitration 
requirement ripe because plaintiff "has been or inevitably will be subjected to" the 
requirement). The majority cites all of these cases in paragraphs 10 and 14-15 of the 
decision below. 
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natural stream channel's ability to conduct high water flows, heighten the potential 
for damming, and thus increase the risk of significant flood-related damage to the 
Neighbors' properties. (R. 4-5.) In the event of flooding caused or exacerbated by 
the bridge, the Neighbors allege that the natural stream environment will be 
adversely affected and potentially destroyed. (R. 5.) 
In a preliminary analysis, the Secor Report of September 18, 2006 (also 
attached to the complaint) provided context for these allegations: 
Building the proposed bridge . . . could create a channel constriction -
a point in the channel which would, under high flow conditions, 
provid[e] an opportunity for typical debris, vegetation/trees, rocks, 
and any other urban materials to catch, backing up water. If the 
stream flow is backed up, inundation of the 1 st level flood plane on 
both sides of the stream channel is at significant risk. 
The Brown Residence is located on the river terrace, directly above 
the escarpment along the west side of the Creek. With the instabilities 
observed in and around the escarpment, as well as the settlement 
cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion at the escarpment may 
increase the risks for significant property damage. As proposed, 
construction of the bridge could increase the potential for further 
escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the potential for significant 
property damage or worse. 
(R. 67 (emphasis added); Add. at 32.) 
Currently, a steep, exposed hill, devoid of plant growth, grass or any 
foliation, lies directly to the east between the Browns' home and the Creek. That 
escarpment provides lateral support to the Browns' home. Over time, erosion has 
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worn away the hill exposing alluvial soils at its base to the ever-running flow of the 
creek. (R. 25.) The escarpment is the west bank of the creek, just down grade 
from the proposed bridge and thus would be directly affected by any flooding. 
Erosion to the escarpment has already caused significant settlement and signs of 
collapse on the Browns' property and in their home. (R. 6, 67.) As explained by 
Secor, accelerated erosion resulting from flooding on the first-level flood plane 
caused by the flow restriction of the proposed bridge will result in additional 
settlement, collapse, and ultimately the destruction of the Browns' property. (R. 6, 
17, 67.) The Sorenson property is also situated above and adjacent to property 
lying directly in the first level flood plain. Damage to that property will undermine 
the lateral support to the Sorenson property. 
In sum, flooding of the creek will impair the integrity of the ground 
supporting the Neighbors' homes. The bridge directly increases the risk of such 
flooding and thus of "significant property damage or worse." (R. 67.) 
These allegations are more than enough to establish standing. Like the two 
plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the Neighbors have "allege[d] that [they have] 'suffered 
or will suffer[] some distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a personal stake 
in the outcome of [this] legal dispute.'" Id. \ 19 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 
1148). Like the plaintiffs in Sierra Club, the Neighbors have a "personal stake in 
the outcome of the dispute" even though they face "potential harms" and "potential 
32 
injuries" rather than completed harms. Id. fflf 23, 24, 26, 27, 29. Like the plaintiffs 
in Sierra Club, the Neighbors "are alleging private, rather than public, injuries." 
Id. f 24. And as in Sierra Club, the Neighbors "have a direct interest in the dispute 
as their . . . property values are at stake." Id. \ 26. Judge Thorne accurately 
observed that "[the Neighbors] did allege that the bridge will increase the risk of 
significant damage to their property, and that is sufficient . . . to survive a motion 
to dismiss for lack of standing." Op., J^ 22 (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, this case presents "no concern about courts . . . resolving 
questions that are best left to the other branches of government." Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74, \ 26. The Neighbors are not "expressing generalized concerns about 
the [bridge's] impact on the public at large." Id. ]f 28. They do not seek to use the 
courts to wage a "political or ideological dispute[] about the performance of 
government." Id. \ 17. Nor are they "roving environmental ombudsm[e]n seeking 
to right environmental wrongs wherever [t]he[y] find them," but rather are "real 
person[s] who own[] real homefs] . . . in close proximity" to Little Cottonwood 
Creek and the proposed bridge. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 157. They 
seek only to protect their homes and properties by judicial application of existing 
law to the specific facts of this case. A more traditional and appropriate context 
for invoking the jurisdiction of the courts is hard to imagine. 
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The alternative to granting standing here is the rule Mclntyre advocated, 
which the district court adopted and the majority below affirmed. At the hearing 
on the Motion to Dismiss, the following exchange took place between the district 
court and Mclntyre: 
THE COURT: Assuming I grant your motion to dismiss and 
then the worst fears are realized that you put the bridge in, it's causing 
stoppage. You cannot clear it out. It's caused the erosion, and it's 
caused the erosion to the effect of the Brown[s] and the Sorenson[s] 
are directly aggrieved on it, what happens at that point. 
MR. MCINTYRE: I think they have, at that point, the right to 
- they're not precluded from a right to file an action for injunction. 
But what does it have to do with the state's engineer - engineer's 
decision to put - or allow the bridge to be put in. 
THE COURT: Yeah. But what I'm saying is, that it would be 
two separate issues in my mind. That if the worse fears are realized -
MR. MCINTYRE: Right. 
THE COURT: — after you['re] dismissed out of the case, then 
they're not barred by filing another lawsuit asking that bridge to be 
removed? 
MR. MCINTYRE: Oh, absolutely not. Why would it be? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(R. 252 at 12-13.) 
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In this understanding, potential plaintiffs must sit back and wait until the 
worst-case scenario is impending before they can petition the courts to protect 
them and their properties. That is not Utah law. Under all relevant precedent, the 
Neighbors have alleged a particularized injury. 
2. The Complaint alleges causation. 
In Sierra Club, this Court had no difficulty finding sufficient allegations of 
causation: "Because the Executive Secretary [was] responsible for denying or 
granting permits for the construction and operation of the plant," this Court 
reasoned, "his decision to grant the order is directly connected to the construction 
and operation of the plant and to any resulting harms." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 
32. And "[r]ather than raising general allegations that the mere presence of a coal-
fired power plant will cause the alleged harms, the affidavits point to specific 
aspects of the plant that will cause specific harms." Id, The same is true here. The 
Neighbors' injuries are directly caused by the Division's approval of the permit to 
build the bridge. And the Neighbors have pointed to specific aspects of the bridge 
that will cause specific harms. The causation element of the test is not in dispute. 
3, The relief the Neighbors seek would redress their injuries. 
Lastly, the Neighbors' injuries are redressable, just like the injuries in Sierra 
Club: 
[T]he Board has the power to redress the [plaintiffs'] injuries. 
Through the Sierra Club, the [plaintiffs] have requested that the Board 
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declare the air emissions permit illegal, revoke the order, and remand 
the matter to the Division of Air Quality for further analysis. Because 
the Board is the only party with the authority to grant this relief, it has 
the power to redress the Sierra Club's injury by declaring the permit 
illegal or at least referring the permit to the Division of Air Quality for 
further analysis to ensure that the Executive Secretary's order 
authorizing the plant's operation complies with state and federal law. 
Id.\ 33. 
Again, the same holds here. The Division has the authority to revoke the 
permit granted Mclntyre and the district court has the authority to grant the 
equitable relief the Neighbors seek should they prevail on their claims. Such relief 
would immediately redress the injuries the Neighbors have alleged. Those injuries 
- the potential harm and increased risk caused by the bridge - are directly tied to 
the approval and construction of the bridge. 
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION IS CONTRARY TO BEDROCK LAW 
GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS. 
Judge Thome's dissent convincingly demonstrates that the majority opinion 
conflicts with basic standards of notice pleading and the legal assumption that 
factual allegations in the complaint are assumed true on a motion to dismiss. See 
Op., W 18-22 (Thome, J., dissenting). Like the trial court before it, the majority 
essentially weighed the "evidence" in the complaint and then faulted the Neighbors 
for pleading "conclusory statements" {id. f 13), for not providing "evidence that a 
similar flood is immediate" or impending, and for not supplying facts about "what 
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work was done to Little Cottonwood Creek [since 1984] to prevent future 
flooding." Id % 15. 
Of course, the Neighbors never had an opportunity to present such evidence, 
and none of this is remotely necessary to plead standing. "[U]nder Utah's liberal 
notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient 
to give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Power & Light, 969 
P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). These minimal requirements apply when pleading 
standing. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f^ 32 (allegations of standing are "all that 
is required at this phase"). And "for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, 
the facts alleged in the complaint are to be considered as true, with any inferences 
drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims." Haymond, 2004 UT 27, \ 5. Thus, "[a]t 
the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish standing]." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
As Judge Thorne correctly summarized, the Neighbors' allegations were 
more than sufficient under these standards: 
The complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge will cause "immediate 
and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of flooding in the 
surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and damage to the 
Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge" if that 
flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there is no doubt in 
my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged individualized harm sufficient to 
confer standing in this matter. 
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Op., 120 (Thome, J., dissenting). To be sure, as Judge Thome observed, "both the 
degree and likelihood of harm alleged by [the Neighbors] constitute . . . questions 
of fact." Id. f 19 (Thome, J., dissenting). "Plaintiffs still have to establish their 
alleged facts in order for the district court to ultimately have jurisdiction to 
consider their complaint. But, that is a matter for trial, or pe rhaps summary 
judgment," and not for a motion to dismiss. Id. \2\ (Thome, J., dissenting). The 
majority opinion "improperly weighed the degree of risk alleged by [the 
Neighbors] when it should have simply accepted the allegation of increased risk as 
true." Id. % 22 (Thome, J., dissenting). Judge Thome was exactly right. 
Hence, in addition to misstating and misapplying the test for standing, the 
decision below is contrary to basic principles governing the pleading of standing 
and the adjudication of motions to dismiss. The majority opinion would result in 
the improper dismissal of numerous lawsuits for failure to plead standing with 
great specificity. 
CONCLUSION 
On June 5, 1976, the Teton Dam burst, resulting in 11 deaths, more than 
$300 million in damages, and the entire destruction of small towns.6 The odds of 
such a catastrophe were so slim that there was really no opposition to the project. 
6
 See Teton Dam, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.Org/w/index.php?title=::Teton_Dam&oldid^285094438 (last visited 
May, 4, 2009). 
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Even as water started seeping through the dam, Bureau of Reclamation engineers 
overseeing the project saw no real threat and did not warn homeowners along the 
Snake River. Under the rule adopted by the majority below, homeowners living in 
the shadow of the Teton Dam would not have had legal standing to challenge its 
construction. The mere risk that the dam would break would not be enough. 
Standing would arise only when the deluge was imminent or certain, and a lawsuit 
too late to prevent disaster. That is not Utah law - nor should it be. 
This Court should reverse the majority decision below and remand the case 
for further proceedings on the merits. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Neighbors hereby request oral argument because it will materially assist 
this Court in resolving the issues in this case. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2009. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. 
Alexander Dushku 
Peter C. Schofield 
Justin W Starr 
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN, 
JOSEPH SORENSON AND KATHLEEN 
SORENSON, i n d i v i d u a l s , 
P l a i n t i f f s / P e t i t i o n e r s , 
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THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JERRY OLDS in his capacity as 
the Utah State Engineer, and 




Case No. 060920127 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
April 16, 2002llP.rfc ^ _ 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
'eputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant James A. Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss. The Court 
heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 16, 2007. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Plaintiffs and Defendant James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") all 
reside in an area adjacent to Little Cottonwood Creek located in 
Murray, Utah. Mclntyre desires to construct a bridge from one 
side of Little Cottonwood Creek to the other. On August 21, 
2006, Mclntyre submitted an application with the Division of 
Water Rights of the Utah State Department of Natural Resources 
BROWN v. DIVISION Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
("the Division7') for the construction of the bridge. Plaintiffs 
opposed the construction before the Division arguing such would 
cause significant damage to their property. The Division 
ultimately granted Mclntyre's application for a Stream Channel 
Alteration Permit and Plaintiffs initiated this action. 
In support of his motion Mclntyre asserts Plaintiffs are not 
aggrieved" persons" andTTxave~no~standxng~~to~se^k-judicial review—e£ 
the administrative agency's action. Indeed, asserts Mclntyre, 
unlike the process by which comments are accepted from persons 
who may be interested in a project, the right to seek judicial 
review is limited to those individuals who can "show some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute." Wash. County Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58 f 20 {quoting Nat'l Parks & 
Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1993). In the instant, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs only 
argue that significant damage and injury to their property will 
result. 
While Mclntyre admits that the Secor Report, attached to the 
Complaint, does note some erosion problems for the escarpment on 
the creek's west bank, this is irrelevant, argues Defendant, as 
that escarpment property does not belong to Plaintiffs or 
Mclntyre, but to Jan Glines-Calder Further, asserts Mclntyre, 
Add-2 
BROWN v. DIVISION Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that damage has nothing to do with the bridge, but rather, the 
fact that the western side of the bank has not been armored. 
Additionally, argues Mclntyre, as to their claim for 
injunctive relief, such should be dismissed as Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege facts necessary to support their claim. 
Specifically, asserts Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have only alleged that 
there is evidence of subsidence and cracking and that has 
occurred without the bridge. Moreover, contends Mclntyre, he 
agrees that if the bridge causes damage to Plaintiffs7 property 
he may be liable, accordingly, the harm is not irreparable. 
Further, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have failed to describe 
a particular injury they will suffer, how an injunction would not 
be adverse to public interest, or that they have a substantial 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing, as set forth in the 
case of Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), any uperson 
aggrieved," not just a water user or person whose property lies 
on the banks of a creek, may seek review of State Engineer action 
pursuant to a proposed change application. See Id. at 498. 
Like the plaintiffs in Bonham, assert Plaintiffs, they have 
alleged that significant damage to their property will result 
from the construction of the proposed bridge. Moreover, contend 
Plaintiffs, the engineering reports attached as exhibits to 
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Plaintiff's Complaint plainly set forth the potential damage that 
Plaintiffs may incur should the proposed bridge be constructed. 
With respect to Mclntyre's arguments regarding injunctive 
relief, Plaintiffs assert they do not at this time seek either a 
Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction. Rather, 
assert Plaintiffs, they request that the Court grant permanent 
injunctive relief as a remedy due to the damage that will be 
sustained should the proposed bridge be constructed. Through the 
course of this proceeding, contend Plaintiffs, they will 
demonstrate their entitlement to equitable relief in the form of 
a permanent injunction, as the potential damages they wrill suffer 
if the bridge is constructed will be irreparable and legal 
remedies are inadequate. 
To establish standing under the statute, a person must 
demonstrate they have suffered or* would suffer a distinct and 
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the 
outcome. In the instant then, the Court must ask how far should 
is the "would suffer" be stretched? Indeed, while the 
engineering reports do indicate that w [i]f the stream flow is 
backed up, inundation of the 1st level flood plane on both sides 
of the stream channel is at significant risk," and further that, 
"construction of the bridge could increase the potential for 
further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the potential 
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for significant property damage or worse," the question is, does 
this establish standing? While the report set outs potential 
problems that could occur if certain events come to fruition, the 
Court is persuaded such requires great speculation to find it 
demonstrates an outcome which uwould" occur. Accordingly, 
dismissal as requested is appropriate and, consequently, 
granted.l 
DATED this day of April, 2007. 
xIf, down the road construction of the bridge starts these 
possible events in action, Plaintiffs would then have standing to 
assert their claims. 
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Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, 
Joseph Sorenson, and Kathleen 
Sorenson, individuals, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Division of Water Rights of 
Department of Natural 
Resources; Jerry D. Olds, in 
his capacity as the Utah State 
Engineer; and James A* 
Mclntyre, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070474-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 2, 20Q8) 
12008 UT App 353[ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 060920127 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: Alexander Dushku, Benson L. Hathaway, Peter C. 
Schofield, and Justin W. Starr, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellants 
Sarah E. Viola, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Mclntyre 
Before Judges Thorne. Billings, and Davis. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
[^l Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson, 
and Kathleen Sorenson appeal the trial court's order dismissing 
their case against Defendants James A. Mclntyre, the Division of 
Water Rights of the Department of Natural Resources (the 
Division) , and Jerry D. Olds in his capacity as the Utah State 
Engineer, for lack of standing. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 Plaintiffs and Mclntyre are neighbors with property along 
Little Cottonwood Creek. Mclntyre has property located on both 
sides of Little Cottonwood Creek. In August 2006, Mclntyre filed 
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an application with the Division to construct a bridge across the 
creek to connect the two parts of his property. Plaintiffs 
submitted an objection to Mclntyre's application in September 
2006. In October 2006, the Division approved Mclntyre's 
application; Plaintiffs subsequently submitted a request for 
reconsideration of the Division's approval. The Division denied 
the request for reconsideration in November 2006. 
K3 On December 15, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Proceedings and Agency 
Action and Complaint for Injunctive Relief (the Complaint) in the 
Third District Court, challenging the Division1s grant of 
Mclntyre's application. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that 
the bridge Mclntyre proposed to build would "alter [Little 
Cottonwood Creek!s] channel, and thereby diminish the natural 
channel [']s ability to conduct high water flows, heighten the 
potential for damming, and thus increase the risk of flooding" 
and the damage caused by flooding in the area where Plaintiffs 
reside. Plaintiffs claimed that the location of the bridge was 
"in an area of high flood risk" and that "in the event flooding 
occur [red] due in whole or in part to the construction of the 
proposed bridge, the natural [creek] environment [would] be 
adversely affected and potentially destroyed by the invading 
flood waters." 
^4 In response to the Complaint, Mclntyre filed a Motion to 
Dismiss, claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing. While 
Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss was pending, Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction. The trial court denied that motion in March 2007. 
In April 2007, the trial court granted Mclntyre's Motion to 
Dismiss. Plaintiffs now appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^5 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when 
it granted Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing. 
11
 [T] he question of whether a given individual . . . has standing 
to request a particular [form of] relief is primarily a question 
of law . . . . " Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Morgan, 2003 UT 58, H 18, 82 P.3d 1125 (second alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, "for 
purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in 
the complaint are to be considered as true, with any inferences 
drawn in favor of the plaintiffs' claims." Haymond v. Bonneville 
Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, ] 5, 89 P.3d 171. 
However, in this case we look at more than just the statements 
and allegations made in the complaint because Plaintiffs attached 
an engineer's report to their complaint. Therefore, we 
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acknowledge that "there may be factual findings that bear on the 
issue [of standing] , " and we review those factual findings "with 
deference." Berg- v. State, 2004 UT App 337, % 5, 100 P. 3d 261 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
^6 Under Utah law, a plaintiff "must have standing to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the court." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1148 (Utah 1983). "[T]he first and most widely employed standard 
for establishing standing" is also referred to as the 
"traditional test for standing." Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 20 
(internal quotation marks omitted). This test "'requires a 
plaintiff to show some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.'" Id. 
(quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State 
Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)). 
%1 We use a three-part inquiry to determine whether a party has 
suffered such a distinct and palpable injury: 
First, the party must assert that it has been 
or will be "adversely affected by the 
[challenged] actions." Second, the party 
must allege a causal relationship "between 
the injury to the party, the [challenged] 
actions and the relief requested." Third, 
the relief requested must be "substantially 
likely to redress the injury claimed." 
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 2006 UT 
74, U 19/ 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Jenkins, SIS P.2d at 1149-50). If a party can satisfy all three 
parts of this inquiry, then it has standing to pursue its claims. 
See id. 
1)8 We begin by addressing the first part of this three-part 
inquiry--whether Plaintiffs have been or will be adversely 
affected by Mclntyre!s bridge. To make this determination, we 
examine whether Plaintiffs' interests are "(a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)/ see also Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74, % 20 (noting that the plaintiff must have "'a real 
and personal interest in the dispute1" (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d 
at 1150)) . 
\9 The United States Supreme Court has noted that a 
particularized injury is one that "affect[s] the plaintiff in a 
20070474-CA 
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personal and individual way." Luian, 584 U.S. at 560, n.l. It 
is clear from the complaint that Plaintiffs in this case have a 
personal interest in the dispute. They own property along Little 
Cottonwood Creek where Mclntyre has built his bridge. Their 
property is at risk if there is significant flooding of Little 
Cottonwood Creek. Thus, Plaintiffs have a personal interest in 
the construction of Mclntyrefs bridge. 
[^10 The requirement that the injury be actual or imminent is 
more troublesome. "The 'Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy 
, . . standing requirements.1" Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 
366 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc)). However, "when standing is based upon the 
threat of future injury, a plaintiff must show that the threat of 
injury is both real and immediate, not conjectural or 
hypothetical." Resident Councils of Wash, v. Thompson, No. C04-
1691Z, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33630, at *11 (D. Wash. May 2, 2005) 
(citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). 
There is no specific formula for determining when a future threat 
of injury qualifies as real or immediate. See id. Such a 
determination is individual and must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. See Nelsen v. King County, 895 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th 
Cir. 1990) . However, "what a plaintiff must show is not a 
probabilistic estimate that the general circumstances to which 
the plaintiff is subject may produce future harm, but rather an 
individualized showing that there is a very significant 
possibility that the future harm will ensue." Id. at 1250 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Ull In determining whether Plaintiffs have suffered an actual 
or imminent harm, we review both Plaintiffs1 complaint and the 
attached engineer's report. In Berg v. State, 20 04 UT App 33 7, 
100 P.3d 261, this court recognized a need to review "factual 
findings that bear on the issue [of standingj ." Id. | 5. In 
Berg, the State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 
See id. f 3. Attached to the motion was a sworn affidavit from 
the Utah Attorney General stating specific facts regarding the 
standing issue. See id. The affidavit was reviewed by both the 
trial court and the appellate court in determining that the 
plaintiff did not have standing. See id. H 4, 10. Similarly, 
we also review certain facts that bear on the standing issue in 
this case. 
Hl2 We conclude that Plaintiffs' claim is too speculative to 
amount to an actual or imminent injury. Plaintiffs' complaint 
makes the following allegations: 
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19. The approved bridge will . . . diminish 
the stream[!]s ability to conduct high water 
flows and thereby increase risk and danger of 
flooding, and in the event flooding occurs, 
the surrounding stream environment will be 
unnecessarily and adversely affected. 
20. Construction of the proposed bridge and 
access ramps will alter the streams channel, 
and thereby diminish the natural channel [ls] 
ability to conduct high water flows, heighten 
the potential for damming, and thereby 
increase the risk of flooding in the 
surrounding areas. 
21. As observed in the Spring of 1984, the 
location of the bridge is already in an area 
of high flood risk. The approved bridge, if 
constructed, will only enhance the already 
high flood risk and danger to . . . 
Plaintiffs1 . . . properties. 
22. In the event flooding occurs due in 
whole or in part to the construction of the 
proposed bridge, the natural stream 
environment will be adversely affected and 
potentially destroyed by the invading flood 
waters. 
24. The [engineer's report] demonstrates 
that . . . [w]ater flow like that experienced 
in 1984 would flow over, and significantly 
increase the stress on, the bridge as 
approved. 
25. The [engineer's report] . . . 
demonstrates that if flows similar to those 
in 1984 are experienced in the stream channel 
. . . the erosion could cause the stream 
banks to overflow and inundate the first 
level flood plains on both sides of the 
stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such 
an event will cause significant erosion and 
damage to . . . Plaintiffs[' property]. 
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28. Plaintiffs have already observed 
subsidence of their property in areas close 
to . . . Little Cottonwood Creek. 
29. Additionally, Plaintiffs have observed 
foundation and settling cracks on structures 
.located on the property as a result of the 
subsidence of the areas near . . . Little 
Cottonwood Creek. 
30. The construction of a bridge in this 
environmentally fragile area will result in 
irreparable harm and damage to . . . 
Plaintiffs and their property. 
1|l3 These allegations do not rise to the level of demonstrating 
an actual or imminent injury to Plaintiffs. The majority of the 
allegations are simply conclusory statements that thfe bridge will 
alter Little Cottonwood Creek's natural stream flow and that 
Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs. The complaint 
simply provides the Plaintiffs' opinions regarding their fears 
and concerns of a potential future harm. 
1|l4 We acknowledge that the complaint does assert some actual 
facts suggesting that a flood or high water flows would cause 
harm to Plaintiffs' property. These facts are•supported by the 
engineer's report and are focused on the Little Cottonwood Creek 
flooding that occurred in 1984. Indeed, the engineer's report 
attached to the complaint shows a danger of possible damage to 
Plaintiffs1 property if Little Cottonwood Creek's water flows 
reach the same levels that they did in 1984. However, the 
potential dangers are contingent on key, unknown events—an 
increased water flow or a flood--which are dictated by unknown 
weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs' injury depends on 
"'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or 
indeed may not occur at all.'" Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. 
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (quoting 13A Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (2d ed. 
1984)J.1 As the District of Columbia Circuit held, "[i]t is not 
1. We recognize that Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural 
Products, Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985), discusses the 
requirements for a ripeness challenge. However, "[a ripeness] 
argument could easily be reformulated in terras of standing. . . . 
'The doctrines of standing and ripeness are closely related, and 
in [some] cases . . . overlap entirely.'" Lane v. Stephenson, 
No. 96-C-5565, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18346, at *8 n.4 (N.D. 111. 
Dec. 9, 1996) (second alteration and second omission in original) 
(continued...) 
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enough . . . to assert that [the plaintiff] might suffer an 
injury in the future, or even that [the plaintiff] is likely to 
suffer an injury at some unknown future time. Such 'someday1 
injuries are insufficient." J. Roderick MacArthur Found, v. FBI, 
102 F.3d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
Kl5 Plaintiffs' complaint provides evidence of Little Cottonwood 
Creek flooding in 1984. However, the 1984 flood is the only 
specific evidence of flooding that Plaintiffs allege. That flood 
occurred over twenty years ago. Plaintiffs have not made any 
other allegations or offered any other evidence that a similar 
flood is immediate or at least "certainly impending," see 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) . Further, it is 
unknown what work was done to Little Cottonwood Creek after the 
1984 flood to prevent future flooding in the area. Because 
Plaintiffs' injuries require this court "to infer what events 
might transpire to cause [Plaintiffs] harm in the future, the 
[standing] requirement [s are] not met." LPA Inc. v. Chao, 211 F. 
Supp. 2d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2002).2 
CONCLUSION 
tl6 We conclude that although Plaintiffs have demonstrated an 
individual, particularized interest in the construction of 
Mclntyre's bridge, they have not demonstrated that any potential 
injury to their property is actual or imminent. The threat of 
1. (...continued) 
(quoting Smith v. Wisconsin Dept. of Aqrric, 23 F.3d 1134, 1141 
(7th Cir. 1994)) . 
2. Defendants argue on appeal that Plaintiffs' claim for 
injunctive relief is not moot because che bridge has already been 
built. Given our decision on the standing issue, we do not need 
to address this issue. Still, we recognize that Plaintiffs filed 
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction prior to the bridge's construction while Mclntyre's 
Motion to Dismiss was being considered. Because Plaintiffs took 
active measures to prevent the construction of the bridge and 
because we have the authority to restore the status quo by 
ordering the bridge removed, Plaintiffs' appeal on that issue is 
not moot. See Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) ("It has 
long been established that where a defendant with notice in an 
injunction proceeding completed the acts sought to be enjoined 
the court may by mandatory injunction restore the status quo."). 
Moreover, we note that after Plaintiffs filed their appeal, 
Mclntyre moved this court to dismiss based on grounds of mootness 
and we denied that motion. 
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any harm to their property is too speculative because it is 
contingent on unknown future events. Accordingly, we affirm. 
JudffrfM. Billings , Judge v J 
117 I CONCUR: 
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
^18 I respectfully dissent. Although I do not disagree with the 
majority's treatment of standing law as it applies to this case, 
I believe that the district court acted prematurely in 
determining a lack of standing at the motion to dismiss stage. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges an increased risk of substantial 
harm to their property as a result of Mclntyre's bridge, and in 
my opinion, that is all that is necessary to survive a motion to 
dismiss. 
Hl9 nl [Sltanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be 
satisfied1 before a court may entertain a controversy between two 
parties," Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, % 12, 154 P.3d 808 
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington County Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, \ 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125) . 
However, even though standing is a prerequisite to a court 
hearing a matter, that does not always mean that standing can be 
easily resolved early in the proceedings. Indeed, standing 
issues may present questions of fact that need to be resolved 
through the ordinary adversarial process. Cf. Morgan, 2003 UT 
58, | 23 ("Whether the Conservancy District advanced sufficient 
evidence to establish that its water rights would be enhanced by 
any forfeiture of the CPB's rights is a question of fact." 
(emphasis added)). In this case, both the degree and likelihood 
of harm alleged by Plaintiffs constitute such questions of fact. 
f20 "'When determining whether a trial court properly granted a 
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to 
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the non-moving party. ,,f Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, U 2 
n.l, 79 P.3d 974 (quoting Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, f 2, 20 
P.3d 895). Thus, the only question we should be considering on 
appeal is whether Plaintiffs' complaint alleges sufficient harm 
to confer standing, not whether that harm actually exists. I 
believe that the complaint clearly meets this requirement. The 
complaint alleges that Mclntyre's bridge will cause "immediate 
and irreparable harm," "increase the risk of flooding in the 
surrounding areas," and "cause significant erosion and damage to 
the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge" 
if that flooding occurs. Taking these allegations as true, there 
is no doubt in my mind that Plaintiffs have alleged 
individualized harm sufficient to confer standing in this matter. 
^21 Of course, Plaintiffs still have to establish their alleged 
facts in order for the district court to ultimately have 
jurisdiction to consider their complaint. But, that is a matter 
for trial, or perhaps summary judgment.1 Cf. Utah Chapter of 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^  28 n.3, 148 
P.3d 960 (describing the procedures employed to determine* 
standing in Morgan, 2003 UT 58, including a trial at which both 
sides were permitted to present expert witnesses). It should not 
have been resolved against Plaintiffs upon a motion to dismiss. 
Counsel argued as much at the hearing on Mclntyre's motion: 
[B]ased on the allegations, Your Honor, at 
this point, we would respectfully urge that 
1. Arguably, the district court converted Mclntyre's motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by considering 
materials outside of the complaint. See, e.g., Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890, 897 (Utah 1996) (u'[L]abels do not control, 
[and] where the trial court, in effect, properly treats such a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment nut erroneously 
characterizes its action as a ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, the ruling will be reviewed as if it 
had been a ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'" (citation 
omitted)). The majority opinion does not address this aspect of 
the district court's decision, and I will not either. I do note, 
however, that if we were to treat this as a summary judgment I 
would still be inclined to reverse the district court based on 
Plaintiffs1 request to be allowed to "flush in the facts." See, 
e.g. , Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^1 12, 
104 P.3d 1226 (stating that a motion to dismiss "shall be 
converted into one for summary judgment if fmatters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court? and all 
parties receive 'reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.'" (emphasis added) 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b))). 
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the plaintiffs ought to at least have an 
opportunity to flush in the facts. Mr. 
Mclntyre ought to have the opportunity to get 
an engineering report and to see if there are 
disputes of the fact. And if so, then have a 
hearing on that issue. And then, Your Hdnor, 
then it would be ripe for this court to 
determine, are you an aggrieved party, or are 
you not an aggrieved party? 
The procedure suggested by Plaintiffs1 counsel would have 
provided an appropriate method of resolving the standing issue, 
although the trial court may have appropriately decided to 
proceed along another path. 
[^22 Mclntyre !s bridge may or may not present the risk of harm 
alleged by Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs did allege that the 
bridge will increase the risk of significant damage to their 
property, and that is sufficient, in my opinion, to survive a 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In granting the motion, 
the district court improperly weighed the degree of risk alleged 
by Plaintiffs when it should have simply accepted the allegation 
of increased risk as true.2 In my opinion, this was error by the 
district court, and I would reverse the dismissal order and 
remand this matter for further proceedings. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
£^Zs4 77. 
William A. Thorne Jr. 
Associate Presiding Judge 
2. To the extent that Plaintiffs1 complaint lacks clarity as to 
the degree of risk that it is asserting, I believe that it is 
reasonable to infer that they are alleging a substantial risk 
sufficient to confer standing in this matter. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to such reasonable inferences when facing a motion to 
dismiss. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, \ 2 n.l, 79 P.3d 
974. 
20070474-CA 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING cmO 
mrOH&UcCOmE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of October, 2008, a true and 
correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the United 
States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be 
delivered to: 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY 
ALEXANDER DUSHKU 
PETER C. SCHOFIELD 
JUSTIN W. STARR 
KIRTON & MCCONKIE 
60 E S TEMPLE #1800 
PO BOX 45120 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0120 
SARAH E. VIOLA 
MCINTYRE & GOLDEN LC 
3838 S W TEMPLE STE 3 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 
JAMES A. MCINTYRE (Courtesy Copy) 
MCINTYRE & GOLDEN LC 
3838 S W TEMPLE STE 3 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4115 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (Courtesy Copy) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NORMAN K. JOHNSON 
JULIE I. VALDES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1594 W N TEMPLE. STE 300 
PO BOX 140855 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0855 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & LYN MACLEOD 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Add-20 
J u d i c i a l / S e c r e t a r y ^ 
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 060920127 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20070474-CA 
A d d J 2 1 
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. (Bar No. 4219) 
Loyal C. Hulme (Bar No. 7554) 
Peter C. Schofield (Bar No. 9447) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801)328-3600 
A ttomeysfor Petitioners/Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN, 
JOSEPH SORENSON, and KATHLEEN 
SORENSON, individuals, ' 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs, 
v. 
THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JERRY D. OLDS, in his capacity as the Utah 
State Engineer, and JAMES A. McINTYRE, 
an individual, 
Respondents/Defendants. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS AND AGENCY ACTION 
AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
Judge: \\H^?&\ 
civil NO. ryp(VY2ftVZn 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson, and Kathleen 
Sorenson, "Plaintiffs," by and through counsel undersigned, hereby Petition this Court for 
judicial review of final, informal, adjudicative administrative proceedings as described below 
and for a complaint against Respondents/Defendants hereby alleges and complains as follows: 
Add-22 
PARTIES 
1. Lawrence Brown is an individual residing at 510 East 5600 South, Murray, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Marilyn Brown is an individual residing at 510 East 5600 Souths Murray, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Joseph Sorenson is an individual residing at 5741 South Ridge Creek Road, 
Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Kathleen Sorenson is an individual residing at 5741 South Ridge Creek Road, 
Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. The respondent agency is the Division of Water Rights ("Division") of the 
Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah, with a mailing address of 1594 West 
North Temple, Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6480. 
6. Jerry D. Olds is the Utah State Engineer and Director of the Division of Water 
Rights of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah, with a mailing address of 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, P.O. Box 146300, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6480. 
7. James A. Mclntyre, "Mclntyre," is an individual residing at 558 East 5600 South, 
Murray, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
JURSDICATION AND VENUE 
8. Jurisdiction is proper in the above-entitled Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4(7)(a) and 63-46b-15. 
2 
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9. Venue is appropriate in the above-entitled forum pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-15. 
BMXSROmm AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
10. This is an action which seeks review of an administrative dfecisidirb Fthe Division 
approving Mclntyre's application for the construction of a bridge over the Little Cottonwood 
Creek located in an area between homes owned by the Plaintiffs. The proposed bridge would 
span an area which is environmentally fragile and which has been the site of significant flooding 
as recently as 1984. Shetdd'fhe proposed bridge be allowed to be constructed, the construction 
will cause immediate and irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs and their property. 
11. On August 21, 2006, the Division received an application for the construction of a 
bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek submitted by Mclntyre. See August 21, 2006 Application 
Number: 06-57-29SA from Mclntyre, attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
12. If constructed, the proposed bridge would be placed between the home currently 
owned and occupied by Plaintiffs Lawrence and Marilyn Brown and the home currently owned 
and occupied by Plaintiffs Joseph and Kathleen Sorenson. 
13. In response to the application, on September 20, 2006, Plaintiffs submitted, 
through counsel, an Objection to Mclntyre's Application to Alter a Natural Stream. See 
September 20, 2006 letter, attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
14. On October 11, 2006, the Division approved Defendant Mclntyre's application 
for Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA, effectively approving the 
construction of a bridge over Little Cottonwood Creek located at approximately 558 East 5600 





15. On October 31, 2006, and in accordance with the requirements provided in Utah 
Code Annotated §63-46b-13 and Utah Administrative Code Rule R655-6-17, the Plaintiffs 
submitted a Request for Reconsideration of the Division's approval- of .Defendant Mclntyre's 
application for, Steam Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA. -See October 31, 2006 
letter from Plaintiffs, attached hereto as Exhibit "D." 
16. Thereafter, On November 17, 2006, the Division issued a letter to Plaintiffs in 
which the Division denied Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration and upheld its decision to 
approve Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA. See November 17, 2006 letter 
from the Division, attached hereto as Exhibit "E." This is the final agency action to be reviewed. 
17. Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain de novo judicial review of this final agency action 
in these informal proceedings in accordance with Chapter 46b of Title 63 of the Utah Code in 
that Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies, judicial review is not expressly 
prohibited by statute, and Plaintiffs have filed this petition within 30 days after the date that the 
order constituting the final agency action was issued, as time is calculated under Rule 6(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
18. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the final agency action as Utah Code 
Annotated § 73-3-29(4)(b) states in pertinent part that an application to alter or relocate a stream 
channel should not be approved if such alteration or relocation will "unreasonably or 
unnecessarily adversely affect . . . the natural stream environment; [or] unreasonably or 
unnecessarily diminish the natural channel's ability to conduct high flows." 
19. The approved bridge will be in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 73-3-29(4)(b) 
in that it will diminish the streams ability to conduct high water flows and thereby increase the 
4 
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risk and danger of flooding, and in the event flooding occurs, the surroutiding stream 
environment will be unnecessarily and adversely affected. 
20. Construction of the proposed bridge and access ramjjs wiir alter the streams 
channel, and thereby diminish the natural channels ability to conduct high water flows, heighten 
the potential for damming, and thereby increase the risk of flooding in the surrounding areas. 
21. As observed in the Spring of 1984, the location of the bridge is already in an area 
of high flood risk. The approved bridge, if constructed, will only enhance the already high flood 
risk and danger to the Plaintiffs and other surrounding properties and landowners. 
22. In the event flooding occurs due in whole or in part to the construction of the 
proposed bridge, the natural stream environment will be adversely affected and potentially 
destroyed by the invading flood waters. 
23. In conjunction with Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs submitted a 
Hydrological Evaluation prepared by Secor International. See Secor Report, attached as Exhibit 
"F." 
24. The Secor Report demonstrates that the approved bridge design provides for a 
one-foot clearance over a high water mark of 526 cubic feet per second. On June 1, 1984, the 
flow through Little Cottonwood Creek exceeded 70% of the design water height flow (a water 
depth of 6.58 feet, or a water flow of 898 cubic feet per second). Water flow like that 
experienced in 1984 would flow over, and significantly increase the stress on, the bridge as 
approved. 
25. The Secor Report also demonstrates that if flows similar to those in 1984 are 
experienced in the stream channel (as altered by the construction of the approved bridge), the 
erosion could cause the stream banks to overflow and inundate the first level flood plains on both 
5 
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sides of the stream in the vicinity of the bridge. Such an event will cause significant erosion and 
damage to the Plaintiffs and other property owners adjacent to the bridge. 
26. Even if an alternative bridge design were considered, the danger of damage to the 
Plaintiffs woul,& b& present. The Secor Report detailed that the deck of Jhe proposed bridge 
could be raised to 7.5.feett(6.5 feet to address the 1984 water flctws.plus one additional foot of 
clearance). However, the access ramps on both sides of the deck would also h^ve to be raised to 
meet the adjusted deck height. 
27. While the design change would accommodate increased water flow, the adjusted 
access ramps could create a dam for debris caught on the bridge. Because the bridge deck would 
be at a higher elevation than the surrounding stream banks, water dammed-up by debris caught 
on the deck and access ramps could quickly rise above the stream banks and flood onto the 
surrounding first level floodplains. 
28. Plaintiffs have already observed subsidence of their property in areas close to the 
Little Cottonwood Creek. 
29. Additionally Plaintiffs ha^re observed foundation and settling cracks on structures 
located on the property as a result of the subsidence of the areas near the Little Cottonwood 
Creek. 
30. The construction of a bridge in this environmentally fragile area will result in 
irreparable harm and damage to the Plaintiffs and their property. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Review and Reversal of Agency Action) 
31. Plaintiffs incorporate herein all other allegations contained in this Petition and 
Complaint. 
6 
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32. Plaintiffs are entitled to a review by trial de novo of the final agency action, with 
the Court making its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, giving no^ deference to the 
determinations and proceedings of the Division. 
33. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order of the Court setting aside the a'ggncy action and, 
effectively, denying and reversing the Approval of the Application to Alter 1a Natural Stream 
Channel Number 06-57-29SA issued by the Division. 
34. The Plaintiffs are further entitled to an order of the Court staying the Division's 
Approval of the Application to Alter A Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA pending 
final resolution by the Court should the Division refuse to order a stay. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief) 
35. Plaintiffs incorporate herein all other allegations contained in this Petition and 
Complaint. 
36. Plaintiffs are in danger of suffering immediate and irreparable injury to their 
property rights if Defendant Mclntyre constructs a bridge as has been approved by the Division. 
37. If Defendant is nox enjoined from consiructing the proposed bridge and/or 
otherwise restrained as set forth herein, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm. 
38. Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain preliminary and permanent injunctive relief which 
enjoins and restrains Defendant Mclntyre, his respective agents, employees, successors and 
assigns, from constructing a bridge in the area in question. 
Add-2 8 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Blown, Xose^h Sorenson, and 
Kathleen Sorenson pray for judgment against the Division and Defend^ ^fclntjorp on all claims 
for relief as follows: 
1. For an order reversing and denying the Approval of the Applipation to Alter a 
Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA issued by the Division; 
2. For the entry of a preliminary injunction and permanent inunction which enjoins 
and restrains Defendant Mclntyre, his respective agents, employees,, successors and assigns, 
from constructing a bridge in the area in question; 
3. For costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this action; and 
4. For such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
DATED this l<> day of December, 2006. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Plaintiffs Addresses: 
Lawrence and Marilyn Brown 
510 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Joseph and Kathleen Sorenson 
5741 South Ridge Creek Road 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Benson L. Hathawayy 
Loyal C. Hulme 
Peter C. Schofield' 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Salt Lake County Flood Control 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 








f*fr. Loyal Huime 
Kirton & McConkie 
80 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Cursory Hydrologica! Review Report 
Proposed Bridge at 558 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84017 
Dear Mr. Huime: 
In accordance with SECOR International Incorporated (SECOR) proposal #09-12-06-01 „** 
please accept the foltowing letter report documenting ob$erved hydrofbgical conditions v 
directly upstream of 5600 South Street, in and around Little Cottonwood Creek (Creek)* 
The purpose of the Cursory Hydrotogical Review was to evaluate flood potential and 
possible erosion hazards should the proposed Mclntyre Bridge, as described in the Joint 
Permit Application Form, be constructed. 
The site and surrounding area was visited on September 14r 2006 by Darin Worden* Sorrier 
Hydrologist for SECOR. Approximate property boundaries fn the area were described by 
the Brown family The ar&ayfqs ob$erved from both the Brown and Sorenson properties 
along the river %tJ£^o |^ the^ Creek. Additionally, the Creek's channel was 
hiked from appp^rTOfe^fC^j^r^above the approximate proposed bridge location tolhe 
box culvert at S#0 Sot^Stneet A not to scale Area Map prepared with Hie site walk 
observation data in attedhed as Figure 1, Please refer to Figure 1 for a better 
understanding of the area descriptions provided below. 
Photos with associated descriptions and explanations are attached. The photos were taken 
during the above referenced site vfelt The photos am numbered 1 through 8, Photo 1 was 
taken on the up stream end of the observed area, and the photos continue in sequence to 
Photo 8, taken on the down steam end of the observed area. The approximate photo 
locations are presented on Figure 1. Further discussion of the photographs Is presented in 
the following sections of this report 
General Setting 
Little Cottonwood Creek In this area has incised (cut) info a former dettalc type deposition^ 
feature (river defe into a former lake) associated wfth a former and much higfifer level of the 
Great Salt Lake. The eastern flank of the channel Is for the most part developed with 
residential housing. The majority of the homes adjacent to the channel appear to be 
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 Sjtuate(j o n Q^ 1* level ftoodptain approximately 8 to 10 feet above the current stream flow 
level. 
Department of Natural Resources 
Salt Lake County Flood Control 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
September 20, 2006 
Page 12 
Mr. Loyal HytaJu. 
September 18f2tfOS 
Psge2 
The western flank of the observed area Is a combination of a river terrace extending an 
approximate 75 feet or more above the 1* level fibodplain, and a small ansa (approraroataJy 
2-3 acres in ske) which makes up the only 1* level floodplain area on the^ l f t §&fe<$the 
channel. There Is currently no development fii the 1st level floodplain area on the west side 
of the Creek; all current development is located on the nver terrace, approximately 75 feet 
(or more) in elevation above the channel. 
Based on review of information in the Joint Permit Application Forip -the^proposed* bridge 
would be installed at the approximate location presented on Figure 1. 
Current *nd Existing Erosion Conditions 
The slope from the river terrace down to the channel, a fon^f f^ 'w^s^^^t t i fe^ t^ek, is 
veiy steep* With the excepflon of the approximate 2-3 acre *F1^^^ l fe ipKA area 
described above, the river terrace slope is in direct contract with the Creek's channel. The 
deltaic deposits which make up the river terrace are primarily fine sand and silt. The steep 
slope is quite unstable unless vegetated. Numerous areas of historic rill and gully erosion 
were observed. No recent erosion evidence was observed in these areas. Along the down 
stream end of the 1** level floodplafn along the west side of the Creek, evidence of recent 
and very^acflve erosion was observed. This erosion has B^^^^i^by flie Creek's 
cbannetmfgrafionlnto the river terrace. The Brown Residence % I§Ba^^difeefiy2ad|adent 
to the zone of greatest erosion. The Creek's cutting into ttfe river ts*tfkfe%lthfe*area-has 
caused an approximate 20 foot high escarpment Additional^ 
associated with mature trees directly above and around m ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ o f c r s f e r v e d . 
The approximate location of the escarpment and associated alignment of file Creek and trie 
Brown Residence Is presented on Rgure 1. 
No active erosion along the Creek's eastern flank was observed. The eastern channel 
bank has been armored with large rock in all cut-bank sections. A cut-bank sectiorr fe along 
the outside stretch of a channel bend where typical erosion takes place, A good example of 
channel armoring Is shown In Photo 3. The approximate location of observed channel 
armoring Is presented on Rgure 1. 
Channel armoring was only observed in two areas along the Creek's western flank. One 
armored section, as shown in Photos 1 and 2, was observed approximately 100 yards 
upstream from the start of the 1* level floodplain. The second area of channel amvDring 
was observed directly upstream and adjacent to the escarpment described above, and 
directly below and adjacent to the down stream end of the 1 * tevel floodplain. This area is 
shown In Photos 4 and 5. 
A key point Is that from approximately 100 yards up stream from where the 1st level flood 
plain starts, to the escarpment located at the down stream end of this area, the western 
side of the channel has not been armored and is therefore, prone to erosion and 
subsequent channel migration. Additionally, it is likely that the channel forces responsible 
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forthg e^capme i^a^g^^a t least partially enhanced by the placemertf of armoring and 
channel stabilization efforts along'the east flank of the Creek. 
Potential Influences of the Proposed Bridge 
The proposed bridge would be located near the up stream end of the 1** level fioedptein 
area located on the west side of the Creek. This approximate location is dam^&am of 
any armoring on the west side of the channel. As previously described, Ira fSck of 
armoring, on the west side oj4he channel translates to a greater risk of bank erosion and 
subsequent channel migration. 
Btfffcfcng ffte propos&rf fcrfcfgre as dfescff&ecf in the Joint Permft Appifeafforr F&np^ittdi^&afe 
a channel constriction ~ a point in foe channel which would, under high flow c^Sltens, 
providing an opportunity for typical debris (vegetation/trees, rocks, arid^^r^^tfrer.trrban 
material) to catch, backing up the water. !f the stream flow is backed up, inundation of the 
1*1 level flood plane on both sides of the stream channel is at significant rfek. 
Photos 7 and 8 show settlement cracks along the eastern side of the Brown Residence. 
The Brawn Residence ts located on the river terrace, directly above the escarpment along 
the Wfcst side of the Greek. WHh the instabilities observed in and around the escarpment, 
as wen as the settlement cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion at the escarpment may 
increase the risks for significant property damage. As proposed, construction of the bridge 
could Increase the potential for further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the 
potential for significant property damage or worse. 
R^omm&ncfetions 
fn the channel's current condition without construction of the bridge, the non-armored west 
bank and most importantly the escarpment area are at significant risk of further einosfan and 
potential property damage. Building the-bridge as proposed only Increases the risks for 
significant erosion and associated flooding on both sides of utile Cottonwood Creek. It is 
SECOR's opinion that a complete engineering study be undertaken to evaluate these risks, 
before moving ahead wfSi any stream alteration plans fn (hfs area. Addftfonaffy, SECOR 
recommends work begin immediately to stabilize the escarpment and mom completely 
understand ft& Brown Residence settlement cracks. 
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Please contact the undersigned Tf you require further daHffe^t^oF^^^oiWBMiirfe^R, 
Sincerely, 
5ECOR International Incorporated 
Darin Warden David D; 
Senior Hydrotogtet Senior a 




P C O R INCORPORATED 290 Conejo Ridge Ava, Suite 200 
C V* ^J I \ MVLWKTUWMCU Thousand Oaks, Q\ 01361 
805-230-1266 TEL 
605-230-1277 FAX 
October 30, 2006 
Mr. Loyal Hulme 
Kirton & McCfonkte 
60 East South Temple, t*800 
S a l t L ^ k e X t ^ u M s W l " 
RE: Promse^m^^^p East 5600 South Street 
Hydtofogic Evaluation 
SECOR Project No.: 26OT.97G0Q.06.0002 
Dear Mr. Hulme: 
SECOR J n t e r n a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ (S^JOR) is grateful for the oppprtui 
^using 
information suppIfe^llrKSe property owner, Jim Mclntyre, in his permit application along 
with readily available data on the creek morphology and histonk^i^ws. SECOR 
understands that this bridge has been permitted (No, 06-57-29SA) fefetfee jstate of Utah 
Department of Natural Resources Division of Water Rights. 
Photos of the Little Cottonwood Creek in the vicinity of the Site show extensive numbers of 
cobbles and boulders. Such size rock is typical of high flow conditions. Additionally, bank 
cuts indicate that the predominant soii in the area is composed of much finer particles such 
as sand and silt Spjis composed of finer particles are more susceptible to erosion. Thus, 
should the flows overtop,the banks, overall erosion will likely increase. 
The bridge design includes erosion protection in the form of riprap aprons beneath the 
respective ends of Ihe bridge based on Sheet 1 of the materials supplied^Jp^ypM 
Engineering, Inc. (MCM) for the permit application. The Sheet 1 design details iaf^yde the 
following: 
1) Two opposing banks of layered loose nprap rock for energy dissipation to minimize 
erosion of channel banks, 
2) Bank slopes as drawn on Sheet 1 at almost 1:1, which is steep and calculations 
herein use a more conservative 2:1 slope (27.5 degree angle); 
3) High water mark is taken as 4318.00 feet relative to mean sea level (rms!) and 
drawn five feet above the channel bottom, 
4) Trapezoidal channels lined with rocks on the banks, but not on the bottom, and 
5) Boulder riprap sized nominally at 18 inches throughout to protect the banks. 
Calculations were conducted herein to estimate the required size of riprap for Ihe design 
provided by MCM. These calculations are based in part on the US Army Corps of 
Engineers (ACOE; 1984) Engineer Manual and the US Department of Transportation 





Hydraulic Engineering Circular No. 15, Third Edition (USDOT, 2005), and R§jpe4. 
Before conducting calculations, it was noticed that a design ovei^s^ft i^^s gn Sheet 1. 
The erosion potential is greatest where velocity of flow is greatest, WM\% ^ $fe bottom of 
the channel (aka creek bottom). No riprap is shown on the channel bottom. Assuming the 
channel bottom is composed of alluvial materials a ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ k ^ t e I ' d b e 
included atong the channel bottom from bank to bank, ffftfs, ^ ^ F ^ ^ ^ p ^ w ^ ^ riprap 
is sized appropriately for future flows, scour could undermine M&Wg&M ^ ^ ^ bank 
and result in its failure. 
The calculations herein are very dependent on the assumptions made inJJie,Sh§et 1 
design. For instance, channel geometry affects flow rate, flow rate affe©ts Millar stress, 
shear stress affects appropriate rock size selection, rock size affects ^annt^geometry^ etc. 
Thus, it is not the intent of these calculations to derive an appfopfe^elf^rdesfga The 
intent is to evaluate whether the specified riprap size of 18 iricftesffs ai|Mc^^fEft dAhdring 
the banks, and the channel bottom if such was property included in the design. 
Overview of Calculations 
The hydrologic evaluation applied here uses simplified flow dynamics. Hydrologic 
parameters used include flow rate, channel geometry, channel slope, and shear stress. 
Flow velocity and depth of water vary depending on channel bed gepinetiy, slope, and 
roughness. These are in part functions of rock size and shapfe/ i$£p^s$|£& conditions 
affect the loose riprap lining the channel as larger shear stresses requrre^^^Srripfap. 
A design flow rate is not assumed, though once the calculations are complete, the resultant 
flows are compared to historic flows between gauging Stations Crestwood (#239) and 300 
West (approximately 6 miles northwest of Crestwood). The Site is located approximately Vz 
of the way between these two stream flow gauging stations. InitiaNferations to derive flows 
and velocities for creek stages of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 feet were calculated using Manning's 
Equation assuming a trapezoidal cross-section. 
Manning's Equation 




V= average velocity (ft/sec); 
/c= 1.49 (when Manning's equation is expressed in English units); 






ri = Manning's roughness coefficient (unitless); 
R = hydraulic radius of the flow (ft); and 
S = c h a n i ^ ^ ^ ^ j ^ r ^ o r e rigorously, energy slope) (fl/ft). 
The hydraulic ra**s&te ittei$red as the flow cross-sectional area 
perimeter. The4#^rat^^ detained by multiplying the average fto# 
section area. 
For a trapezoidal cross-section: 
Where: 
V = -R2/3SU2 
n 
P 
And b is the channel base width, T\s the top of channel width, y is flow depth, and zs and z2 
are horizontal widths of opposite banks (see graphic below). The Froude number equation 
is: 
F = F- \(g*A'COs0) 
Where: 
^ = tan"1(5) 
Cross-Section of Channel Channel Side View 






The selection of an appropriate value for Manning's roughne§s ^ | ^ ^ | M ^ ^ p ^ based 
on observation and experidfece. Manning's n values v^ry^^ft^^^^^^^P%fe"1bhanneI 
b e d * a n d ^ ^ , a s ^ ^ ^ a m o u n t of vegetation growth in t h 0 ^ f e i ^ | ^ * ^ fewSh few 
depth. §infp f^heF-fteWs would require larger riprap wfoHb | ^ | ^ f t | p ^ ® l ^ m t o ^ s n 
values, calculations herein used larger n values for deeper flow ctep#rs (Tables 1mt&2% 
Channel Slope 
The channel slope fe not linear over the approximately 300 yards surveyed up and 
downstream of the Site. Therefore, an average slope was used based on elevations at the 
respective ends of the surveyed creek reach. This resulted in an average slope of 0.QQQ26 
fi/ft, which is relatively gentle. This single slope value was used here for the loose riprap 
size calculations. 
Velocities and Flow Rates 
Flow rate (Q) of water in a channel is governed by depth of water, hydraulic gradient, 
channel geometry, and roughness coefficient This relationship takes into account 
principles of conservation of linear momentum, which take into apcgynt variations in 
momentum related to shear stress- The results are calculations ^ oj^mjtetg^'fy and flow 
rate. Derivation of these values for creek flow depths were specified at 1,2,3, \ and 5 feet 
(Table 2). Velocities calculated were 2.80 to 4.04 feet per second (ft/sec> for 1 and 5 foot 
flow depths, respectively. Flows were 50 to 526 cubic feet per second (fr/sec) for 1 and 5 
foot flow depths, respectively. 
Historic annual peak flow data at the two gauging stations mentioned above are as high as 
898 ft3/sec on June 1,1984. This flow is 70% higher than the flow of 526 ffifeec derived for 
a water depth of 5 feet Since the historic data span an interval of less than 25 years, it is 
possible that flows could.even -be -higher in a 100-year flood scenario. Indeed, in order to 
obtain a flow of 898 f^Iseo using Manning's equation, the depth of water would have to be 
6.58 feet, which is above the bottom of the bridge. Thus, debris in the flow would catch on 
the structure. 
Shear Stress 
The hydrodynamic force created by water flowing in a channel causes a shear stress on the 
channel bottom and banks. The bed material resists this shear stress by a trgcfive force, 
Tractive force theory states that the flow-induced shear stress shouJd-npkprodiice a force 
greater than the tractive resisting force of the bed materiaL ThaAPpfesibJe ©^critical shear 
stress (rp) in a channel defines the force required to initiate movemegfcofrttie channel bed 
or lining material (e.g., riprap erosion). 





Shear stress in a channel is unevenly distributed over its wetted spface. The J3|||e^ drear 
stress occurs parallel to the bed gradient at maximum flow depth (i.e., creek bettBm) and 
will change in proportion to changes in either of these parameters. Because of the uneven 
distribution of shear stress, channel design should be based on shear stress at maximum 
flow depth as is represented by the following relationship. The permissible shepr stess (rp 
in units of lb/ft2) for a straight channel occurs on the channel bed at nfaximuroJ(tep4h, and 
can be computed as follows: 
Where, 
Vp = pemri&sitte vfefotife^t^cuiated from Manning's equation^of flow)* 
n = Manning's coefficient; 
7 = unit weight of water (62.4 lb/ft3); 
d = maximum depth of flow (ft); 
a = unit conversion constant (1.49); and 
R = hydraulic radius (cross-section area over perimeter length, A/P; ft). 
SolvingaManningUequationfor depth of flow, the maximum shear stress can be calculated. 
Flow around bends also creates secondary currents, which impose higher shear stresses 
on the channel sides and bottom compared to straight reaches. The maxfrnum^shear stress 
in a bend is a fariltforpof^the^fetio &>f channel curvature to bottom width. T h ^ j ^ d shear 
stress can be computed using the following relationship: 
Tb ~ Kb T p 
Where, 
rb = bend shear stress (lb/ft2) 
Kb = ratio of channel bend to bottom shear stress, a function of FVB 
Re = radius to the centerline of the channel (ft) 
B = bottom width of the channel (ft) 
rp - maxim&fn^fefiirsfslbfe shear stress (lb/ft2) 
For the Site, the^ bends were considered sufficiently large that Kb was at its constant 
minimal value. Tfius^bend shear stress will only be slightly larger than straight channel 
shear stress in the calculations herein. 
Bed Material (Loose Riprap) Size 
The permissible shear stress for non-cohesive soils is a function of mean diameter of the 
channel material. In this application, bed material in contact with flow will be riprap of 
boulder dimensions. For large riprap, the permissible shear stress is given by the following 
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TP -rk^demmsMe shear stress* (lb/ft2) 
F*» S C H R f f f ^ e t e r (0.047, dimensionless) 
7S = ^ H ^ ^ i # i l t b n e (165.4 lb/ft3); 
D50 = mean riprap size (ft) 
Solving the equation for stone size, we get 
D5O = T P / ( F . ( 7 5 - 7)) 
Where the chanme^i^ak^ja torn, the riprap size is caicufetad3usgig&^4epd shear stress 
(rb) instead of the permissible shear stress (rp). 
D5o = Tb / (F-(7 s - 7)) 
For trapezoidal channels lined with gravel or riprap, haying ^ s j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f r^than 3 
horizontal to 1 vertical (>3:1). side slope stability must also b^c6rjsM^3- " i l l s analysis is 
performed by comparing the tractive force ratio between side "slopes and charmer bottom 
(K2) with the ratio of shear stresses exerted on the channel sitie^aa^iboftom (Kt). The 
required rock size for the side slopes is found using the following equation: 
(Deojsides = FCj / K2 (Dsojbottom 
The tractive force ratio, K2 can also be calculated using the following equation; 
K2 = sqrt (1 - sin20 / sin2<J)) 
Where. 
6 = angle of side slope (degrees) and 
cp =s angle of repose (degrees) of the rock. 
Summary 
The design specifications submitted by MCM calculate to a design riprap that is equivalent 
to the side sizes as called out on Sheet 1 (18 inches). However, Sheet 1 does not specify 
bottom riprap, of any size. Bottom riprap should be included that is a mean diameter of 10 
inches. These calculations apply for a flow equivalent to that of the maximum observed 
over the last 25 years. There is no evidence that this flow represents a 100-yqar event. 
Such an event could result in substantially larger flows, in which case these riprap sizes are 
insufficient to resist erosion. 
While the Sheet 1 specifications are over-designed for the specified flgw^ it is prudent 
practice to place anchor rock along the up gradient and down gradient edges of a loose 
riprap surface. Anchor rocks are somewhat larger than the design size. The Sheet 1 





design shows no such rode Additionally, to strengthen loose riprap, it is common practice 
to place smaller rock (e.gM cobbles) m the interstices of the riprap as keys to lock the rock 
matrix. No mentfon of Ms is made in the application materials. 
Given ihe one foot clearance of the bridge over tffe desl^r^fc^water mark fSBH #^spcflow 
rate), the observed-flow of more than 70% over the ^ esfgn^a|%ftejght flew f l ^ i ^ s e c on 
June 1,1984), and the known entrapment of trees \h high fto^ys^lAe ^M^mmmd Creek, 
it is very likely that this bridge would catch debris and $fe Overtopped, wftfeh would 
significantly increase siress on the bridge and increase erosion potential in the area. 
Additionally, the calculated 6.58 foot water depth at the 898 ff/sec flow rate, using the 
channel geometry created'by construction of the bridge, would overtop existing banks in the 
area and begin to inundate the first level floodplain on both sides of Little Cottonwood 
Creek. 
An alternative to constructing the bridge as approved would be to raise the deck to allow a 
total of 7.5 feet of water flow depth (6.5 feet as calculated for the 898 ftVsec flow rate plus 1 
additional foot of free board) to pass under the bridge. This design change would require 
raising the ^^^^fg^B&JS^ s l c l e s °^ ^ e c°ttonwood^Creek an equal height This 
would solve t h e ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e d with passing the 898 ff/sec flow under the bridge; 
however, the access ramus'then create a dam whereby if the bridge catches debris or 
trees, a greater volume of water can be backed up behind the bridge. The bridge deck 
would be at an elevation higher than the surrounding stream banks and backed up water 
would pour over the stream banks onto the first level floodplain on both sides of the Creek. 
In this scenario, raising the height of the bridge deck may actually increase the flooding 
potential to a greater degree, when compared to constructing the bridge as approved. 
In conclusion, the approved design for permit No. 06-57-29SA is inadequate to address 
erosion and would further enhance erosion and flooding potential in the vicinity of the 
bridge. Using either bridge design as described above increases the risks to the home 
owners in the area. 
Please call us with any questions you may have regarding this report at (805)230-1266 
x282, or (801)327-7814. 
Sincerely, 
SECOR International Incorporated 
ffY 
James "Jay" MacPherson, Ph.D., P.E. Darin Worden 
Senior Engineer Senior Hydrologist 
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Kb = function of RJB 
Re = radius to the centerline of the channel [feet] Side slope (degrees) 27.5 
B ~ bottom width of the channel [feet] 
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K2 = V(1 - sln20 / sin2cp) M i k , a K} / K 2 (D60)bottom 
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